Why Indo-Pacific middle powers are building networks, not alliances

Julia with fellow delegates at the Asan Plenum in Seoul in April 2026

The Indo-Pacific is undergoing a structural transformation. The post–Cold War order —characterised by US primacy, expanding economic interdependence, and a broadly accepted if imperfect rules-based system — is eroding. In its place is a more fragmented and contested environment marked by intensifying great power rivalry, weakening institutional constraints, and rising uncertainty about the durability of long-standing security guarantees.

For the Indo-Pacific’s middle powers, these dynamics pose a fundamental question: how to preserve autonomy, stability, and prosperity in a world where liberal multilateralism can no longer be taken for granted.

The answer emerging across the region is not the construction of a NATO-like alliance system – despite some prominent calls for its creation. Instead, it is the gradual consolidation of a layered security architecture – a networked system of overlapping alliances, partnerships, and minilateral arrangements designed to maximise flexibility, manage risk, and build resilience. The challenge now is to strengthen it.

The limits of collective defence in Asia 

"The Indo-Pacific differs fundamentally from the transatlantic context in which NATO emerged." (Photo: NATO Parliamentary Summit; author Juris Vīgulis, Saeima)

Calls for an “Asian NATO” are not new. They have resurfaced periodically, often in response to rising concerns about China or questions about US commitments to the region. Yet such proposals have consistently failed to gain traction — and for good reason.

The Indo-Pacific differs fundamentally from the transatlantic context in which NATO emerged. Europe’s Cold War security environment was defined by a clear and proximate threat, relatively aligned political systems, and geographic contiguity. These conditions enabled the creation of a formal collective defence organisation anchored in Article 5 commitments.

None of these conditions exist in the Indo-Pacific. Geography alone complicates collective defence. Unlike Europe’s contiguous landmass, the Indo-Pacific is vast, maritime, and fragmented, making unified defence commitments operationally complex.

More importantly, threat perceptions differ widely. For some countries, China is the primary concern; for others, economic interdependence tempers security anxieties. Domestic politics also constrain ambitions. Public support for binding mutual defence obligations remains uneven, and even among close partners, appetite for extending defence guarantees is limited.

Southeast Asia presents an even greater challenge. Many states in the region prioritise strategic hedging, seeking to balance relations with both China and the United States. A formal alliance structure risks forcing binary choices – undermining ASEAN’s long-standing emphasis on sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus-based decision making.

China's maritime claim (red) and UNCLOS exclusive economic zones (blue) in the South China Sea (Photo: Wiki images; author: Goran tek-en)

Even among US allies, deeper integration faces barriers. Trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States has advanced significantly in recent years, but historical tensions and differing strategic priorities continue to limit its scope.

In short, the Indo-Pacific lacks the structural and political foundations necessary for a NATO-style alliance.

The case for layered security 

Rather than pursuing a single overarching alliance, the Indo-Pacific should embrace what it already has: a multi-layered security architecture.

At its core are bilateral alliances, particularly those linking the United States with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. These remain the backbone of regional deterrence.

Surrounding these are bilateral and plurilateral agreements among regional actors themselves. Reciprocal access agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and defence cooperation pacts have proliferated in recent years, enabling greater operational flexibility and interoperability. For example, last year New Zealand signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with the Philippines and an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan, which enhances cooperation in areas such as joint exercises, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response.

In 2024, The Philippines and New Zealand agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to Comprehensive Partnership by 2026 to deliver real benefits and advance the two nations’ shared security and economic interests (Phoro: Wiki Images; author: Philippines Presidential Communications Office)

Overlaying both are minilateral groupings – small, purpose-driven coalitions focused on specific issues or domains. These include:

• The Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States), with an emphasis on non-traditional security and public goods.  

• AUKUS (Australia, United States, United Kingdom), centred on advanced military capabilities and technology sharing. 

• IP4 (Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand), focused on increased security cooperation among NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners. 

This architecture is not centrally coordinated. It is decentralised, adaptive, and often overlapping. Yet it is precisely these characteristics that make it effective.

Taken together, these arrangements form a flexible ecosystem rather than a rigid bloc.

This model offers several advantages.

First, it is adaptive. Different groupings can address different challenges – from high-end deterrence to non-traditional threats like cyber security, disaster response, and infrastructure resilience.

Second, it is politically sustainable. Countries can participate at varying levels without committing to blanket defence obligations, preserving strategic autonomy while deepening cooperation.

Third, it enhances interoperability and trust. Regular exercises, shared technologies, and coordinated planning gradually build habits of cooperation – critical in a region where strategic trust has historically been low.

Finally, it supports a transition from the traditional US-centric “hub-and-spokes” model to a more distributed networked security system. In this emerging configuration, US alliances remain central, but regional partners increasingly connect directly with one another – creating resilience even if US engagement fluctuates.

From architecture to action 

Former Royal New Zealand Navy ship HMNZS Manawanui partakes in a tactics exercise with Royal Brunei Navy (Photo: Wiki Images; author: United States Navy)

If layered security is the right model, the priority now is to deepen cooperation so that it is more effective and resilient. What does this mean in practice for New Zealand and our partners in the region?

Efforts could include expanded reciprocal access agreements, allowing forces to train and operate more seamlessly across the region. It might mean investing in joint operational planning, including shared facilities and coordination hubs to respond to a wide range of events from natural disasters through to harder security challenges. It may also mean greater defence industrial cooperation, from co-development of capabilities to more integrated supply chains with like-minded partners.

Importantly, these efforts can be issue-driven and modular. The region’s flexible architecture means that different constellations of countries can work together on specific challenges, whether that be maritime security threats, cyber security, climate change, or transnational crime.

Toward collective resilience 

In sum, the Indo-Pacific is unlikely to see the emergence of a single, unified security architecture. Nor should it.

The region’s diversity, complexity, and strategic realities demand a different approach – one that prioritises flexibility over rigidity, networks over blocs, and resilience over formal commitments. Layered security offers such an approach. It is not a second-best alternative to collective defence; it is a model better suited to the challenges of today.

 The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.