Pakistan: leveraging geography into relevance in the Iran war

Pakistan’s geographical location is at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East

In moments of geopolitical flux, states often rediscover the enduring value of geography. For Pakistan, this advantage is neither new nor accidental—it is structural. The two-week ceasefire announced on 8 April, followed by the first round of US-Iran talks in Islamabad on 11–12 April, briefly placed Pakistan at the centre of regional diplomacy. Yet with a second round now cancelled, Islamabad is also confronting the limits of mediation.

As tensions sharpen between the United States and Iran, and diplomatic channels oscillate between coercion and conciliation, Pakistan’s relevance is once again being framed in familiar terms: as a potential intermediary, a stabilising conduit, or a go-between. Yet to reduce Islamabad’s role to episodic diplomacy risks missing the deeper logic that underpins its strategic utility.

Pakistan’s geographical location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East remains its most consequential asset. It sits astride two of the United States’ most persistent strategic theatres: Iran and Afghanistan. To Pakistan’s west lies Iran, a state at the centre of one of Washington’s longest-running geopolitical confrontations. To its northwest lies Afghanistan, where two decades of American military engagement failed to produce a stable political outcome, but did cement Pakistan’s role as an indispensable, and at times exasperating, actor.

This dual adjacency is not incidental; it is foundational. It places Pakistan within the operational ambit of US Central Command (CENTCOM), embedding it within the architecture of American military planning for the broader Middle East. It is this geography that continues to tether Washington, however uneasily, to Islamabad.

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2,600km boarder

US-Pakistan ties: a durable bargain

Historically, this geography has translated into influence. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89), Pakistan, under President General Zia-ul-Haq, became the principal conduit for US and Saudi support to the Afghan Mujahideen. The anti-Soviet campaign, often retrospectively framed as a decisive victory in the Cold War, would have been operationally impossible without Pakistan’s logistical networks, intelligence facilitation, and territorial access. This was not a peripheral contribution; it was central. The war entrenched a pattern that would re-emerge two decades later.

Following the September 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistan, under General Pervez Musharraf, once again became a “frontline state” in the US “War on Terror” in Afghanistan. Air corridors, ground supply routes, and intelligence cooperation all flowed through Pakistani territory. Yet this phase also exposed the contradictions at the heart of the relationship. While Islamabad publicly aligned with Washington, elements within its security establishment simultaneously maintained ties with the Taliban and other militant groups. The presence of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, approximately 100 km from Islamabad, in 2011 crystallised American frustrations, deepened mistrust, and triggered calls in Washington for a fundamental recalibration.

Pakistan's then prime minister General Pervez Musharraf met former US president George W Bush in Washington in 2006 as part of a broader effort to address the challenges posed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan

But despite these ruptures, the relationship never fully collapsed. It could not. The structural logic of geography imposed limits on estrangement. The United States, even at moments of peak frustration, recognised that disengagement from Pakistan would come at a cost to its broader regional objectives. Conversely, Pakistan’s military establishment has long operated on the assumption that American reliance, however reluctant, would eventually reassert itself. This mutual awareness has produced a relationship best described as transactional but resilient: neither alliance nor antagonism, but a calibrated interdependence shaped by converging, if not always compatible, interests.

It is within this context that Pakistan’s current positioning in the Israel-US-Iran dynamic must be understood.

Pakistan’s balancing act in the Iran crisis

Islamabad’s outreach is not merely an opportunistic bid for diplomatic visibility; it reflects a deeper strategic instinct to leverage geography into relevance. By maintaining working relations with Tehran while sustaining functional ties with Washington and, by extension, with US allies in the Gulf, Pakistan offers itself as a space where diplomatic communication, however limited, remains possible.

The appeal of such a role lies in credibility across divides. For Iran, Pakistan is a neighbouring Muslim-majority state with which it shares economic, cultural, and sectarian linkages, including a significant Shia population within Pakistan itself. For the United States, Pakistan is a known quantity—an often-exasperating partner, but one embedded within decades of military and intelligence engagement. This dual familiarity creates the conditions for what might be termed “conditional trust”: not trust in intentions, but trust in access.

Pakistan (green) and Iran (orange) share a 909km border

However, Pakistan’s interest in de-escalation is not purely diplomatic; it is existential. A full-scale confrontation involving Iran would place Islamabad in an acutely precarious position. Aligning openly with the United States and its regional partners (especially Riyadh, with which it signed a defence pact in 2025) against Iran risks internal destabilisation, given Pakistan’s sizeable Shia population and the history of sectarian tensions. The domestic fallout of such a choice could be severe, potentially triggering unrest that the state may struggle to contain.

At the same time, neutrality is not without cost. Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities—including chronic balance-of-payments pressures, dependence on external aid and financing, and periodic reliance on International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan programmes—limit its strategic autonomy. In moments of crisis, these constraints can translate into external pressure, particularly from Washington and its allies. The risk, therefore, is not simply of choosing sides, but of being compelled to do so.

Geography, in this sense, is both an asset and a constraint. Pakistan’s location enables it to act as a bridge but also creates vulnerabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in its western periphery. Relations with Afghanistan, particularly under Taliban rule, have become increasingly fraught, eroding what was once perceived as strategic depth. To the east, India remains a persistent security concern for Pakistan, with periodic escalations reinforcing the centrality of the eastern front in Pakistan’s military planning. In such a scenario, the prospect of a third front, emanating from conflict with Tehran, is not merely undesirable; it is strategically untenable.

This tri-front anxiety has only sharpened Pakistan’s current diplomatic posture. With talks in Islamabad stalled, Islamabad has stronger incentives than Washington to prevent further escalation.

Its engagement in the unfolding Iran crisis is as much about conflict avoidance as it is about influence projection. By positioning itself as a facilitator of dialogue, Islamabad seeks to pre-empt a scenario in which it is forced into a binary choice with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Geography as leverage and liability

For Washington, the calculus is equally pragmatic. The United States is acutely aware of Pakistan’s duplicity in past engagements, yet it also recognises the limits of exclusion. In a region where direct communication channels are often constrained, intermediaries, however imperfect, retain value. Pakistan’s utility, therefore, lies not in alignment, but in access: access to actors, to terrain, and to networks that remain critical to American strategic objectives.

President Donald Trump met with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in the Oval Office in September 2025 (Photo: Wiki Commons; author: The White House)

This is particularly relevant in the context of great power competition. As the United States seeks to recalibrate its global posture in response to China’s rise and Russia’s assertiveness, the broader Middle East and its adjoining regions, including Afghanistan, continue to matter. Pakistan, by virtue of its geography, sits at the intersection of these theatres. Its ability to influence outcomes may be limited, but its ability to complicate or facilitate external strategies is not.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s role in the current moment should not be overstated, but neither should it be dismissed. Its significance does not derive from diplomatic theatrics or episodic mediation, but from a more enduring reality: it occupies a space that others cannot easily replicate. Geography, in international politics, is the most persistent form of power. It may not guarantee success, but it ensures relevance.

For Pakistan, that relevance has been both a shield and a burden. It has enabled the state to navigate periods of isolation and to extract concessions from stronger powers. But it has also entrenched patterns of dependency and opportunism that have complicated its long-term stability. As the Israel-US-Iran dynamic continues to evolve, Pakistan’s challenge will be to convert geographic advantage into strategic coherence, moving beyond reactive positioning towards a more sustainable articulation of its role in the region.

Whether it can do so remains an open question. The cancelling of a second round of Islamabad talks is a reminder that geography can create opportunity, but it cannot guarantee diplomatic outcomes.

About the author

Divya Malhorta is a senior fellow with the Centre for New Age Warfare Studies, Delhi, and a visiting fellow with the Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS), Bangalore, specialising in Middle East politics. She has previously been associated with India’s National Security Council’s Advisory Board (NSAB).

The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.