What the ASEAN Future Forum reveals about Viet Nam’s intentions for the region
Reflecting on the recent ASEAN Future Forum in Hanoi, associate professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington Manjeet Paradesi examines Viet Nam’s efforts to shape a changing regional order, and what its ambitions mean for countries such as New Zealand.
Viet Nam's Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính at the 48th ASEAN Summit Plenary in Cebu, Philippines, in May this year
Viet Nam has been quietly but purposefully accumulating regional diplomatic capital. The third ASEAN Future Forum (AFF), held in Hanoi on June 9 and 10 under the theme "Shaping Our Future Together: Peace, Prosperity and People-Centered", was the latest expression of that ambition.
First introduced by Viet Nam at the 43rd ASEAN Summit in 2023, the AFF is designed as a multi-stakeholder platform to complement existing ASEAN mechanisms and support long-term policy thinking for the ASEAN community.
It has since grown into something more: a genuine convening space for policymakers, scholars, journalists, business leaders, and the next generation of regional voices, one that blends strategic seriousness with a commitment to inclusivity that is sometimes missing from the more formal intergovernmental settings. Pre-event panels on a range of strategic themes were held on June 8 at the Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam, a fitting venue, given Viet Nam's increasingly self-assured regional role.
The high-level attendance confirmed the forum's growing stature.
ASEAN Future Forum of Viet Nam delivered the keynote, joined by the prime ministers of Cambodia (Hun Manet), Lao PDR (Sonexay Siphandone), Thailand (Anutin Charnvirakul), and Timor-Leste (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão), as well as ASEAN secretary-general Kao Kim Hourn. Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos Jr sent a recorded video message warmly endorsing Viet Nam's initiative, noting the resonance of this year's theme with Manila's own ASEAN chairmanship vision of "Navigating Our Future, Together."
The simultaneous presence of the Thai and Cambodian prime ministers – meeting on the margins of a regional forum even as their countries remain locked in the aftermath of a serious border conflict – was itself a quiet demonstration of Vietnamese diplomatic skill.
The Thailand-Cambodia conflict, rooted in long-contested claims over ancient temple sites along their shared border, resulted in more than 100 deaths and the displacement of over half a million civilians in 2025.
The Thai-Cambodian border dispute has persisted for over six decades, spanning roughly 800 kilometres of contested and ambiguously demarcated territory
While there has been a ceasefire since late December 2025, sporadic incidents and pervasive mistrust persist. Viet Nam's ability to bring both parties to the same table is no small feat, and a reminder that ASEAN's consensus-driven diplomacy, often criticised for its procedural conservatism, can produce results precisely because it does not demand that members resolve their disputes before engaging collectively.
The conflict formed an unavoidable backdrop to discussions at the AFF, but it did not dominate them. Many speakers returned instead to the diagnostic framework offered by President Tô Lâm at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore just days earlier.
In his keynote address to Asia's premier defence forum, President Tô Lâm argued that current global landscape reflects the convergence of three foundational crises, unfolding simultaneously: a crisis of the international order, a crisis of development models, and a crisis of strategic trust. This framing resonated strongly at the AFF, partly because it reflects Viet Nam's increasingly confident voice in shaping the regional conversation.
Major power dynamics and the "leaderless order"
A recurring theme across the forum's sessions was how ASEAN should position itself in an era of intensifying great-power competition.
Regional leaders were consistent in rejecting the familiar binaries. ASEAN is not pursuing classical balance-of-power politics; it is not bandwagoning with any single external partner; and it is not retreating into passive neutrality. The preferred framing is along the lines of what one speaker described as a "dynamic equilibrium" – sustained engagement with all external stakeholders, with the explicit aim of ensuring no single power becomes preponderant in the region.
There is genuine ambition here, including aspirations to extend some ASEAN norms, and above all, the commitment to non-use of force, beyond Southeast Asia proper and into the wider Indo-Pacific. This is not naïve: ASEAN states are acutely aware that the current international environment is hierarchical, that formal sovereign equality conceals real power asymmetries, and that managing those asymmetries requires constant diplomatic work.
What the forum's discussions also highlighted was the frank acknowledgment of the current moment's unusual character.
Philippines Prime Minister Ferdinand Marcos Jr. addresses the room at the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines
The US-China strategic rivalry, the structural center of regional competition, differs fundamentally from the Cold War template. The US-Soviet rivalry was organised around ideological enmity; the current contest is centered on technological supremacy, with both sides deeply economically interdependent.
There is no obvious regional hegemon in waiting, nor is there a clear ideological pole around which to organise alignment. The result, as one speaker put it, is something close to a "leaderless order." For ASEAN, this is simultaneously an opportunity and a burden: more room to maneuver, but also more diplomatic weight to carry.
Sub-regional architectures and New Zealand's opening
The second major theme – and, for New Zealand’s purposes, the more actionable one – concerned ASEAN's emerging sub-regional cooperation architecture.
Three mechanisms received particular attention: the Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area, the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle, and the various Mekong sub-regional cooperation frameworks. ASEAN states view these not merely as economic integration instruments but as tools for addressing the significant socio-economic disparities between different parts of Southeast Asia, and as building blocks toward the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
The current priorities are institutionalisation, equitable development, and stronger connections between the sub-regional forums themselves.
External partners are actively being drawn in. Australia's Mekong-Australia Partnership, now in its second phase, represents a combined investment of approximately AU$454.5 million across 2020–2029.
Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong meets with Viet Nam’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bùi Thanh Sơn, in 2024
The scale reflects a serious strategic commitment to sub-regional resilience, and Australia's role as a significant partner was acknowledged at the forum. Australian foreign minister Penny Wong’s video message was played alongside messages from the foreign ministers of Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, and the United Nations deputy secretary-general of the on 9 June.
New Zealand cannot match this financial commitment, nor should it try to compete on those terms. But the conversations in Hanoi revealed something important: what Southeast Asia's sub-regional bodies are also seeking is expertise, soft skills, and ideas – in areas ranging from biodiversity conservation to economic governance and climate adaptation.
New Zealand's comparative advantages in environmental management, agricultural innovation, Indigenous development frameworks, and people-centred approaches to institution-building map well onto these needs.
New Zealand already formally supports the ASEAN-centred regional architecture and shares ASEAN's commitment to non-use of force and opposition to hegemonic dominance. The question the AFF prompted is whether New Zealand is making enough of these points of alignment.
Viet Nam's hosting of the forum was not just an exercise in regional convening; it was a statement of intent about the kind of regional order Viet Nam wants to help build. New Zealand would do well to engage that ambition directly, and the AFF's expanding platform offers a ready vehicle for doing so.
The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.
About the author
Manjeet S Pardesi is an associate professor of international relations in the political science and international relations programme at Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, and an Asia Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies. His research focuses on global orders and global history, great power politics, Asian security, and Sino-Indian rivalry.
