What should we make of China’s military purges?

Zhang Youxia meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2017

In the latest round of high-profile dismissals to shake the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)(.1), General Zhang Youxia (张又侠), vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and China’s most senior uniformed officer, was removed from his post. The move raises significant questions about the PLA’s direction, leadership, and readiness.

Zhang and his CMC colleague Liu Zhenli (刘振立) are accused of corruption, obstructing modernisation efforts, and “trampling” on the Chairman Responsibility System (CRS), the principle that governs command authority in the CMC. Zhang and Liu’s ouster continues a long-running pattern of senior military removals under Chinese leader Xi Jinping and reflects sustained efforts to assert the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the armed forces amid a rapid modernisation programme.

The case is particularly noteworthy given Zhang’s rank, background, and operational experience. The son of an important revolutionary-era general, he is what is known as a ‘princeling’ with a deep party lineage. He saw active combat during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict and later oversaw the PLA’s procurement apparatus, giving him unique insight into the armed forces’ capabilities and organisational limitations.

Andrew Wilford: "The removals have sparked scrutiny of the PLA’s culture, capabilities, and readiness..."

Chinese state media framed the removals as evidence that seniority and power offer no protection from Party discipline. They stress that “no matter how high one’s position or how great one’s authority, all are equal before Party discipline and state law” (不管职务多高、权力多大, 在党纪国法面前一律平等)(.2) Zhang’s dismissal is just the latest in Xi Jinping’s decade-long campaign against graft, which has seen nearly 30 senior figures removed since early 2023.

The removals have sparked scrutiny of the PLA’s culture, capabilities, and readiness, especially amid speculation over contingencies across the Taiwan Strait and modernisation timelines. They illustrate how the PLA is first and foremost a political military with leadership expectations that differ sharply from those applied to professional armed forces elsewhere.

Corruption, control, and institutional reform

Corruption has long plagued China’s armed forces. Practices such as buying commissions, bid rigging (awarding military contracts unfairly to a preferred company in exchange for bribes), and factional competition undermine Xi and the PLA’s ambition to modernise by 2035 and become a “world-class fighting force” by 2049. Zhang’s tenure overseeing procurement placed him at the centre of one of the PLA’s most corruption-prone institutions. In a system that has long rewarded relational exchange, graft cannot be ruled out.

Yet corruption alone cannot fully explain Zhang’s removal, especially given that he survived earlier rounds of purges. Many observers argue that in China’s armed forces, there are times when corruption is the charge, but ideological misalignment is the actual crime.

A political army

The People’s Liberation Army functions as the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party

The PLA is not a national military in the conventional sense, but the armed wing of the CCP, tasked with ensuring the Party’s enduring rule. Founded in 1927, the principle that “the Party commands the gun” was formally established by Mao Zedong at the Gutian Congress in 1929. Far from being esoteric history, this principle remains central to contemporary Chinese military governance, a point Xi Jinping made explicit when convening a 2014 PLA meeting in Gutian.

Simply put, the PLA’s political character is fundamental, and operational authority is inseparable from political obedience.

A contemporary manifestation of this principle is the “chairman responsibility system” (CRS, 军委主席负责制). The CRS formalises supreme command authority in the chairman of the Central Military Commission, currently Xi Jinping, and requires serving officers to demonstrate political loyalty to the Party’s top leadership. The official statement that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli “trampled” (践踏) on the CRS suggests that their failures relate to loyalty and political alignment, an extremely serious charge(3).

Party-military relations in China also reflect a broader Marxist–Leninist logic. In such polities, alternative centres of power must be tightly managed. This imperative is especially strong in China, where the PLA, as an institution, has played a decisive role in key moments of modern political history. Ensuring political loyalty of the armed forces is therefore fundamental for the regime.

Readiness and political control

These factors impact PLA readiness. In China, readiness encompasses material capability, training, command discipline and ideological alignment. Purges aim to strengthen cohesion and reinforce Party control, ensuring the PLA will execute the missions assigned to them.

Some analysts have speculated that Zhang’s removal reflected his resistance to existing timelines, including the oft-cited 2027 benchmark associated with Taiwan contingencies. This benchmark marks the target year by which China’s leadership aims for the PLA to have the means to conduct coordinated operations to assert control over Taiwan if called upon. His experience in the field and overseeing procurement may have rendered him less optimistic about PLA capabilities. His removal demonstrates how personnel changes can create short-term uncertainty while concurrently shoring up political control. It also signals the leadership’s concern about dissent or alternative views, emphasising loyalty over operational prowess.

Andrew Wilford: "The net result is that President Xi is closer to having the military he wants..."

The net result is that President Xi is closer to having the military he wants, one that is unquestionably loyal to the Party and increasingly capable of asserting China’s interests militarily if required. The replacement cohort of new commanders, no matter how loyal, will still require time to establish the institutional linkages necessary for complex joint-force operations. If they align closely with Party objectives, this could accelerate PLA modernisation towards the 2027 milestone, strengthen joint operational capacity over the medium term, and provide the Party leadership with credible military options vis-à-vis Taiwan.

Concentrating authority and eliminating dissent, however, also carries risk. It can heighten pressure for accelerated action, increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait. The leadership therefore faces a balancing act between political control and joint-force operational effectiveness, a paradox that is likely to endure.

Where to from here?

Timing matters. Next year’s 21st Party Congress will determine Party leadership for the next five years, and Xi is widely expected to secure a fourth term as general secretary. Elite jockeying ahead of such events is routine, and it was somewhat surprising that Zhang was removed now rather than quietly retired without fanfare next October. His public ouster signals dissatisfaction with the progress of military modernisation. Given the immense investment the armed forces have received in recent years amid economic challenges, this position is understandable. Zhang’s removal reinforces the principle that the PLA’s political character is fundamental and that operational readiness is inseparable from political loyalty.

Regional implications

For regional observers, the takeaway is not straightforward. The PLA remains a capable military — its breathtaking acquisition of platforms in recent years attests to that. But it is also a force whose priorities are defined chiefly by regime security, followed closely by high-end modernisation and conventional assessments of readiness.

Therein lies the paradox. Efforts to enhance loyalty may strengthen the PLA politically, but they can also introduce short-term operational uncertainty. For regional planners and policymakers, understanding PLA behaviour requires attention not only to hardware and exercises, but also to political signalling, Party texts and broader regional affairs.

Zhang Youxia’s removal demonstrates the complex interplay between political control and military capability in China. Xi may have a more loyal and reliable command structure going forward, but in the short term, the PLA faces challenges balancing discipline and operational effectiveness, and questions remain about what comes next. Whether the CMC will be replenished at an intervening plenum or fully reshuffled at next year’s Congress remains to be seen. Either way, the paradox between readiness and adherence is a structural feature of China’s political system, and Zhang’s ouster does not resolve the tension between them. It only clarifies which priority currently prevails.

Footnotes

• (1.) All branches of China’s military use the term “The People’s Liberation Army.” The full names are as follows: The People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and The People’s Liberation Army Navy.  

• (2.) Unwavering confidence that anti-corruption will prevail and that a strong military will be built.  [ 坚定反腐必胜、强军必成的信念心] PLA Daily. 31 January 2026.

• (3.) China resolute in winning anti-corruption war in military’ [坚决打赢军队反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战总体战] PLA Daily 25 January 2026.

About the author

Andrew Wilford is the centre manager at the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre and a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington working on the People’s Liberation Army. He holds an MA in international relations and a BA in politics from Victoria University of Wellington and was the recipient of the 2022 Terence O'Brien Scholarship in Strategic Studies and International Relations, the 2023 Sir Desmond Todd Memorial Prize for best MA thesis and an Asia New Zealand Foundation Research Grant in 2023. His areas of research include Chinese domestic politics, international relations, the China-India relationship, and the People's Liberation Army.

The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.