Free and Open? ‘Asia-Pacific Values’ and the Meaning of Democracy
In the Indo-Pacific, "Democracy—at least as conventionally understood—has fallen into deep disfavour," writes University of Auckland asscociate professor Stephen Noakes following his participation in the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur last month. In this article, Noakes—who also serves as director of the China Studies Centre—shares his reflections on the roundtable, which he attended as part of an Asia New Zealand Foundation Track II delegation.
Stephen Noakes (centre) with members of the Foundation delegation attending the Asia Pacific Roundtable
Last month, I was privileged to attend the 38th Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Hosted annually by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), the event is Southeast Asia’s premier Track-Two gathering, bringing together top experts to exchange views on key issues impacting the wider Asia-Pacific region.
This year, more than two hundred delegates—drawn from across the academic, think tank and policy worlds—took in range of panels united by the theme of “Recalibrating Asia’s Frontiers.”
Among the 38th APRs many highlights was the opening night address of Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Dato Seri Utama Haji Mohamad bin Haji Hasan, and the keynote by Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia, which came on the final day.
As a watcher of Global China, I was especially keen to hear how the region’s middle powers think about and respond to deepening great power rivalry. Listening to these addresses was an excellent opportunity, and I remain grateful to the Asia New Zealand Foundation for giving me the chance to take them in.
Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim: " The path ahead is to close ranks and act in unison in facing these challenges so that they do not weaken ASEAN as a bloc.”
In many respects, the Prime Minister’s remarks were what one might expect from ASEAN’s new chair, which Malaysia assumed on 1 January 2025. The address underscored Malaysia’s pragmatic, non-aligned foreign policy, and commitment to deepening multilateral cooperation.
However, it was his commitment to the indivisibility of ASEAN states that came through most strongly. In the Prime Minister’s own words, “There are the spectres looming around us – great-power rivalry, gross inequality in countries and in the region, transnational crime, and territorial disputes. The path ahead is to close ranks and act in unison in facing these challenges so that they do not weaken ASEAN as a bloc.”
These remarks were made all the timelier by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, made just a few weeks prior in Singapore, which trumpeted US re-emergence in the Indo-Pacific and its objective of “achieving peace through strength.” By the 38th APRs conclusion, I had formed an impression that for ASEAN members, the need to band together was driven by the unpredictability of US foreign policy under Donald J. Trump. By comparison, Xi Jinping’s China seemed relatively staid.
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth speaking at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue
The three days of the 38th APR left me with cause to consider the mechanisms underpinning the strength-in-unity response from the ASEAN Chairmanship. Cohesion in the face of intensifying competition is typically anchored in common values. But what are these? Much has been made in recent years of “Indo-Pacific values,” yet I am no closer than I ever was to understanding what values, or whose, the term implies.
The ambiguity over what constitutes shared values and principles first struck me at the APRs opening plenary “War, Peace, and the Asia-Pacific.” During her comments, Asia New Zealand Foundation chief executive Suzannah Jessep used the term “authoritarianism” no less than four times.
To my mind, it was a useful way of categorizing the divergent outlooks and value systems at play in the region. As a scholar of democratization who has published and taught on the subject for many years, I appreciated the effort taken to distinguish between liberal democracy and non-democracy, even while acknowledging the slipping democratic status of the US and the challenges besetting democracies in Europe and elsewhere.
Yet others bristled. An initial question from an audience member made it plain Ms Jessep had a pressed a button by using what others felt was a hypocritical or even passe way to refer to the obvious points of difference among key regional players, not least the rival superpowers. Offended by allegations of authoritarianism, there was also a palpable discomfort with referring to oneself as a democracy.
Asia New Zealand Foundation cheif executive Suzannah Jessep spoke at a plenary session titled 'War peace and the Asia-Pacific'
This scene would play itself out many more times as the conference progressed, both in official Q&A sessions at panels and more privately at the bylines. One sentiment, encountered repeatedly throughout the week, was that term “democracy” was too elastic and used too loosely by too many different parties to have much utility in 2025.
Speaking to the breadth of opinions found in ASEAN member states, some indicated a preference for terms like “good governance” over democracy. Their rationale? “Democracy” was simply a label that the US government had itself applied preferentially to countries it deemed to be of strategic value, irrespective of how well it captured the nature of political institutions or the values undergirding them.
Terms like “good governance” were better, it was argued, since they suggested a regime type that was nominally law-bound and competitive but not conferred by American whim, and without the pejorative connotations of as “authoritarianism.”
For some, US hypocrisy extended further still. Indeed, throughout the week I was told repeatedly that membership in the democratic club was a liability, even morally repugnant. Here, the evidence centred on democracies as poor ambassadors for the very values they professed. Current US immigration policy and Israel’s recent activity in Gaza and Iran were given as exhibits A and B. What’s democracy worth, the argument went, if this is how so-called paragon democracies behave?
At week’s end, I returned from Kuala Lumpur uncertain of what values, or whose, unify the Indo-Pacific. One thing I was sure of, however, is that whatever Indo-Pacific values may comprise, democracy—at least as conventionally understood—has fallen into deep disfavour. The upshot is that those who still envision a truly “free and open” Indo-Pacific informed by democratic principles have their work cut out for them.
About the author
Stephen Noakes is Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Auckland. His research has appeared in China Quarterly, Political Science Quarterly, Voluntas, Pacific Affairs, and many other journals and edited collections.
Among Stephen's books are Democratization: A Thematic Approach (Bloomsbury, 2023), and The Advocacy Trap: Transnational Activism and State Power in China (Manchester University Press, 2017).
Stephen has held fellowships at Fudan and Peking Universities, National Taiwan University, and the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs. He is a regular media commentator on China's role in world affairs, and advises the state and non-profit sectors on governance issues in the PRC, both in Aotearoa and internationally.
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