Rethinking immigration

Paul Spoonley is Professor of Sociology at Massey University and Programme Leader for the Integration of Immigrants Research Programme, which is funded by the Foundation of Research, Science and Technology. In this article, he examines the topic of immigration in the context of of both New Zealand and global experiences and policy-making needs.

Traditionally, immigration meant the permanent move to a new country. Governments and host communities were clear in their expectations about how these new immigrants should behave and that they would demonstrate their commitment to their new state and nation. Becoming a citizen was a clear marker that they had transferred loyalty, while citizenship was withheld or circumscribed from others for nationalistic – and often racist – reasons.

Of course, there were strong transnational linkages. In my own family, my father and two brothers came to New Zealand; one sister went to Germany while two others stayed in the UK. There was extensive – if slow and intermittent – contact and the next generation, my generation, have moved backwards and forwards repeatedly to live or holiday in the UK or New Zealand.

But by the late twentieth century, transnationalism had been transformed in both qualitative and quantitative senses. The ease and low cost of travel, new digital technologies and the recruitment (in the case of New Zealand, Australia and Canada) of skilled, highly mobile professionals, many from Asia, significantly altered the nature and density of cross-border connections and activities. And immigration was less a permanent state and more a matter of repeat moves – back to home countries or onwards migration. It was not a one-way move but a matter of circulation.

In the 1990s, we first encountered the terms that referred to aspects of this behaviour, especially in relation to the now considerable numbers who had arrived from various parts of Asia: parachute kids, astronaut families.

New Zealand, probably unwittingly, had made such circulation and transnationalism an easy option. Permanent residence provided almost the same benefits as citizenship, dual or multiple citizenship was seldom an issue, and local expectations about ‘becoming a New Zealander’ were relatively light-handed (with some notable exceptions such as the moral panic in the mid-1990s and New Zealand First). Within a few years, New Zealand had jumped above Canada in terms of the numbers of immigrants as a proportion of the population – and they were increasingly Asian.

It did not end there. The New Zealand diaspora was amongst the highest in the OECD (similar to that of Ireland and Luxembourg at the top of the league table). Immigrants on temporary visas had exceeded those arriving as permanent residents by 2006, ranging from seasonal workers through students to short-term business visas. It was paralleled by the large numbers of tourists. New Zealand’s borders were increasingly porous, even though the vetting and approval procedures for permanent residence were still robust.

In this environment, the traditional notions of immigration and citizenship are at odds with the actual behaviour and commitments of New Zealanders and immigrants alike. Let’s take emigration as an example, as it involves both New Zealand-born and immigrants.

Concerns about ‘brain drain’ were very apparent in the 1999 election (as they had been previously) but a Treasury working paper in 2001 (by H. Glass and W. K. Choy) pointed out that it was more a case of ‘brain exchange’ as the recruitment of skilled migrants replaced what was lost.  But even that hardly captures the complex dynamics of the global circulation of skilled migrants. Is emigration the problem that it is often seen as, both in terms of human capital loss and a commitment to New Zealand? What is overlooked is the fact that many societies have much the same debates.

In January 2009, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada produced a very interesting assessment of the loss of talented young Chinese (referred to as CTEs – Chinese transnational entrepreneurs) as they left Canada (and other countries) and moved back to China. This has been apparent for some time. Since 2000, immigrants who make up half of the workforce in Silicon Valley have been returning as now experienced IT entrepreneurs to both India and China. The Foundation suggests that this is, to some extent, inevitable and that the policy challenge is really to understand why it happens and then to argue that there are long-term benefits such as bilateral trade.

As one example, emigration – temporary or permanent – does suggest that we need to rethink immigration and citizenship policy. My own opinion is that New Zealand has a relatively flexible system that partially acknowledges this enhanced circulation and a less nationalistic stance towards citizenship, even compared to our Tasman cousins in Australia. But I do wonder if the nature of contemporary migration is fully understood by our policy and opinion makers.

There is a footnote to these recent trends: will the current economic crises impact on immigrant/emigrant behaviour? The Economist in January concluded that if economies suffer, migrants suffer as they either do not migrate or they suffer from xenophobia as the labour market tightens. But Demetrios Papademetriou and Aaron Terrazas from the Migration Policy Institute (January 2009) came to slightly different conclusions.

They argued that there would be ongoing skill shortages (in jobs that were unappealing, or those that required specialist knowledge or training such as health care or which were growing rapidly such as eldercare) – and that immigrants would continue to be in  demand in these areas. Return migration would depend on the ease of circulation or the economic conditions of the origin country. The questions they asked concerned whether skilled immigrants would take jobs that underutilised or discounted their skills, and whether entering a destination labour market at this point might have long-term consequences.

In reality, both already occur. The discounting of immigrant experience and qualifications has been widely demonstrated locally and internationally. And there is already evidence that anybody (immigrant or local) entering the labour market during a recession is likely to experience some scarring.

My own view (who knows at this point?) is that some of the circulatory behaviour will be dampened but it will continue. Indeed, if immigrants are skilled, have connections in two or more economies and have access to capital, they might well increase their transnational activities as they seek to reduce risk in one location and to gain benefits in another.

Whatever happens in the immediate future, the current nature of immigration and settlement means that a good evidence base and a healthy debate about the appropriateness of immigration policy is something to be strongly encouraged.