April 2006

New Zealand and East Asia's Security Future by Robert Ayson.

Executive summary

While a preoccupation with security issues in the region helped cement New Zealand’s Asian engagement in the first half of the Cold War period, economic considerations have been uppermost in Wellington’s relations with Asia in more recent decades. This is completely understandable given the relative stability that much of the region has come to enjoy, New Zealand’s relative isolation from any remaining security hotspots in Asia, and the dynamism of so many of Asia’s economies, which has helped underpin New Zealand’s prosperity.

But that same regional economic dynamism, reflected nowhere more than in the rise of China, has important political and security implications for a changing Asia and for New Zealand’s engagement with the wider region. As the regional balance adjusts and as new institutional frameworks and relationships come into play, it is imperative to consider the future of Wellington’s security engagement with East Asia.

With these considerations in mind, this report aims to do two things. First it explores the place of East Asia in the evolution of New Zealand’s security and defence policies over the past 15 years, with a particular focus on current settings. Second it identifies a sensible and sustainable approach for New Zealand that reflects this country’s strong interests in a secure East Asia. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for New Zealand’s policy-making community to consider.

The Asian security agenda in coming years is likely to be no less diverse than is currently the case. Regional policy and decision makers will continue to be confronted by internal security concerns in some of the region’s weaker states, transnational challenges including the security implications of pandemics, terrorism and criminal activity, and interstate security tensions between some of East Asia’s larger powers. Because of its location and the particular security challenges in its regional neighbourhood, much of New Zealand’s immediate attention will continue to be grabbed by internal and transnational security challenges. Wellington is relatively well placed to contribute effectively to regional responses to these challenges. New Zealand’s defence force, for example, has been reshaped in a way that increases its capacity to contribute to peace support and other missions in the immediate region (as well as further afield).

But the developments most likely to determine the overall shape of regional affairs and affect the long-term interests of New Zealand, Australia and their close partners will stem from the changing balance between East Asia’s great powers. Especially important are the evolving strategic relations between China, Japan, India and the United States and the ways these are reflected in the emerging architecture of regional institutions. In terms of the latter, New Zealand has demonstrated a strong commitment to regional multilateral mechanisms including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the recent East Asian Summit and the growing network of free trade linkages in the region. But on the hard security side, in terms of both defence force capabilities and alliance relationships, there are understandable limits to New Zealand’s engagement.

New Zealand needs to chart a sensible and sustainable approach to regional security engagement that ties in with its own preferences and resources. The overall strategy suggested here is a comprehensive and flexible form of regional security engagement that uses an array terrorism and criminal activity, and of relationships, commitments and mechanisms. This means pursuing engagement with the region’s emerging and growing powers including China, India, Japan and South Korea. It means continuing to value the especially strong security relationship with Australia and links with its traditional friends in the nearer parts of the region, including Singapore and Malaysia. It means closing the gaps in New Zealand’s relationship with Indonesia. And it means welcoming opportunities to work alongside the United States and welcoming Washington’s ongoing regional presence.

Such an approach supports New Zealand’s wise preference for open and inclusive regional institution building. It offers flexibility as it does not commit Wellington to a particular constellation in the region ahead of time. But it will be very challenging for any small country with limited resources to seek to be so comprehensive in its approach to the region. These limitations apply to both hard and soft power capabilities. In terms of the former, New Zealand needs to clarify its approach to East Asian security and defence engagement through a suite of new policy documents, including what would be the country’s first Defence White Paper for many years. In terms of the latter, New Zealand needs a tertiary educational sector with far greater literacy in Asian languages and in Asian security affairs.




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