US-Sino relations a recurring theme at talks with China and Vietnam

In November, the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s executive director Dr Richard Grant and research director Dr Andrew Butcher travelled to Beijing and Hanoi for Track II discussions with China and Vietnam.

The New Zealand contingent at the talks also included Professor Xiaoming Huang, Professor Robert Ayson (both based at Victoria University of Wellington) and Asia:NZ young leader Lucy Coghill. New Zealand foreign affairs officials were also present as observers.

Dr Butcher gives us a rundown of what was discussed during the week-long programme.

The Asia:NZ-led Track II delegation to Beijing and Hanoi occurred during a busy week for the Asia-Pacific region. In the gap between the APEC Leaders and East Asia summits, President Obama visited Australia and announced that the United States would be strengthening its bilateral military alliance, Japan signalled its intention to join the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and economically fraught European countries put out the begging bowl to China.

These events and their implications dominated discussions between New Zealand and its Track II partner institutions. Sino-US relations were the thread that ran through everything. The TPP, an economic free trade agreement, was seen by some Chinese as a US-led encirclement of China to complement the “security encirclement” – which had been highlighted by the announcement of increased US military deployment in Australia. Some Chinese noted that, in general, President Obama had shown “unprecedented toughness” about China.

China’s claim to the South China Sea, in the face of competing claims to parts of the sea by various Southeast Asian countries, was something it preferred to deal with bilaterally, and with claimant countries only – ie. not multi-laterally, nor with non-claimant nor extra-regional powers. Indeed, some Chinese analysts told us that the South China Sea dispute was “much overstated and over-exaggerated”. “No China leader,” they added, “would risk undermining their reputation to compromise on the South China Sea.” It was “nationalistic sauce” for government “to add to their ruling legitimacy” and was a political rather than a military dilemma. It was, in the view of some, a political stand-off, not a regional security dilemma. On the other hand, there was a common view that China would not resort to the use of force in the South China Sea.

The impression from the discussions in Beijing is that there is widespread distrust of US motives. All US policy pronouncements and actions are read through that lens. The People’s Liberation Army has more sway over China’s foreign policy than its foreign ministry. Some Chinese were impatient with the pace taken by China’s leaders in projecting what they see as China’s rightful place in the region.

This view is in contrast with the views of foreign powers, which tend to see China as becoming more assertive regionally, not less.

However, there were mixed views on other issues within China. While some saw the TPP as designed to restrict China, others saw it as an important initiative for China to sign up to. China’s leaders needed to balance an increasingly vocal and even nationalistic citizenry against its own soft power, “peaceful rise” ambitions. Some Chinese saw that it was against China’s interests to respond to every provocation by the US, rather to be “purposely blind” in its “smart power” and to hold the line. Regardless of which course China took, it had to take account of public opinion, though had limited room to manoeuvre. 

China was less concerned with the US’ “return” to the Asia region, and rather more concerned with its increased activism in regional issues, including the South China Sea dispute. Despite all this, some Chinese analysts nevertheless saw US policy as incoherent and complicated.

A number of other bilateral relationships between China and its neighbours were discussed. Australia was described as having joined the “democratic alliance” against China, while the bilateral relationship was described as complicated. The relationship between Japan and China in 2011 was described as “better than in 2010”.

On North Korea, some Chinese saw Kim Jong Il as having better health, and likely to lead for another decade. Nonetheless, they saw the situation as pessimistic and noted that China “really dislikes” the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On Taiwan, the Chinese were keen for President Ma to win re-election and worried about cross-strait relations if he did not.

The recent visit of Vietnam’s secretary general to China was seen as “very important” and, allegedly, both sides said that no third country (read: the US) would divide them. On ASEAN, the Chinese said they needed to pay it “more attention” and would be concerned if ASEAN took the positions of the Philippines or Vietnam with respect to the South China Sea disputes. China welcomed Myanmar’s move toward democracy. On India, China said it has never viewed it as a “strategic peer”, and they found India’s role hard to measure.

Vietnam

Vietnam  felt “the heat of China’s rise” almost every day and in every aspect. China, the Vietnamese noted, had a “fierce and competitive” drive for natural resources, which lead to a concern about its “new colonialism”.

China is a divisive issue in Vietnam. There have been 17 wars between the two countries, and some feared there would be more, though they noted that younger generations in both countries had known only peace. China had a “lovable culture” and economy, but as a state was tough to deal with. China was growing faster than expected, accumulating too much power too quickly, and its growth had shaken the confidence of the region. Asian nations were being forced to choose between the US and China; strategic competition between the two countries was a given.

One rising power (China) and one declining power (US) would have to compromise somehow. The Vietnamese offered two assessments of China’s development. First, China was enjoying enormous advantage because of Japan’s economic recession. Second, China faced real economic challenges and was socially unstable.

In this respect, the comment was made that “China’s rise is as likely as China’s demise”. That demise could take  a variety of forms – the  hard-landing of China’s economy, decades of slow economic growth, a middle-income trap, a demographic peak and shortage of labour, scarcity of natural resources, the rise of India, and/or the move of the “world factory” to other countries.

On India, the Vietnamese said that its influence was not much felt by other countries. Vietnam did want to build on its existing alliance with India (they were de facto allies during the Cold War) but did not want to become trapped in a power competition.

The Vietnamese said New Zealand had “enormous soft power”, with a common interest to Vietnam in maritime security. Australia, in contrast, was a “military power”. Some Southeast Asian countries were not large enough to get out on their own, but, the Vietnamese noted, Vietnam was big enough to have options; it didn’t just have to work through ASEAN.

The increased military presence of the US in the region came as no surprise to the Vietnamese, though they noted it would have caused China to worry. For the Vietnamese, US involvement in the East Asia Summit is attractive because of the rise of China. However, US allies wanted more from the US, at a time when it was offering less.

Image:
The New Zealand contingent at the Track II talks in Beijing (L-R) Prof Robert Ayson, Pam Dunn (New Zealand’s deputy head of mission, Beijing), Dr Andrew Butcher, Dr Richard Grant, Pip McLachlan (first secretary, New Zealand Embassy, Beijing), Prof Xiaoming Huang, Huan He (research officer, New Zealand Embassy, Beijing), young leader Lucy Coghill.