Developing regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific

Dr Thomas S. Wilkins is a Lecturer at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney. Returning from the ASEAN-ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Malaysia in June 2009, he reflects upon the prospects for building a stable regional security architecture.

Much debate was raised during the annual ASEAN-Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Asia-Pacific Roundtable on the question of regional security architecture. The key contours of the debate involve the nature of ‘security architecture’, the effectiveness of its existing components, and the prospects for developing a mature and stable regional order in the future.

On the first point, though many consider the meaning of the term ‘security architecture’ to be self-evident, upon closer inspection it becomes more problematic.  Generally speaking, in the words of Professor William Tow, it comprises ‘institutions or associations that shape the context and organisation of [a] region’s security order’.  However, components of the architecture vary widely in their characteristics and functions. 

First, there are economic and security institutions, with divergent memberships and varying degrees of regional coverage, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation  (SCO).

Second, there are a plethora of formal and informal alliances (or ‘alignments’ since not all of these resemble NATO-type organisations), such as the United States-Republic of Korea alliance, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), and the Australia-Japan ‘Strategic Partnership’.

Last, there are ad hoc or issue-specific treaties or regimes like the North Korean Six Party Talks (6PT) or Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking.  It is significant that these components of the extant regional security architecture all display immense structural variation in their purpose, membership, formalisation, scope and capabilities.  For example, APEC is pan-regional in its membership, but confined to economic, rather than security governance at present, while the US-alliance system is indisputably powerful in its defence capabilities, but exclusive in its membership.

On the second point, commentators are divided over the relative role and efficacy of the existing instruments of security governance enumerated above.  There is general, but not universal, consensus that ASEAN and its various offshoots (ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum) act as the linchpin for ‘community building’ in the Asia-Pacific region.

The development of the East Asia Summit (EAS) around this fulcrum certainly offers potential, though many argue that the incorporation of the US into the EAS would be imperative for its success.  APEC has the benefit of being a genuinely pan-regional organisation (if India is allowed to join), but does not enjoy a good track record in security governance - or even economic governance - for that matter.  The SCO is a relative newcomer, and though regarded as quietly effective within its limited remit, does not appeal widely to the remainder of the region.

Thirdly, in addition to developing current institutions, there have been proposals for new initiatives.  Foremost among these has been Prime Minster Kevin Rudd’s call for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ (APC).  This envisages a new truly pan-regional institution (specifically including India, plus the US), ‘able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security’.  Unfortunately, this initiative seems to have gained little traction beyond its rhetorical stage. 

The appetite for new institutions is weak, especially when the APC has to compete with other political projects such as the EAS, and offers no tangible ‘value-added’ at this stage.  Other new alternatives such as a Northeast Asia Security Forum based upon the 6PT, or a Sino-American ‘G2’, have even dimmer prospects at this time.  Hence the future will most likely involve working to improve upon what institutions and associations we already have to achieve a stable regional security regime.