

# Regional Security in East Asia and Beyond<sup>i</sup>

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It appears as if a veritable cottage industry has, in recent times, sprung up around researching on the topic of regionalism. Indeed, this is not just an American or British interest, with Japanese-sourced literature on regionalism and this question of 'just where regionalism is at' in East Asia being very prolific.<sup>ii</sup> Most of this literature that focuses on East Asian regionalism points out that the most progress has been made in the economic realm or in very specific and particular matters such as those relating to environmental agendas.<sup>iii</sup> And the push towards increased regionalism here in East Asia is, as a general rule, seen as a positive move. However there have been a number of developments which suggest change could be afoot when it comes to the issue of regional *security*.

East Asian security architecture is, as many scholars seem to enjoy pointing out, neither particularly complete in reach and depth nor excessively concrete in terms of levels of permanency.<sup>iv</sup> Indeed Alan Romberg, a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Centre has argued that "Security Architecture" is too grand a term for what currently exists in East Asia and what is likely to exist in the foreseeable future. What we have, rather, is a set of security issues and relationships'....'with little prospect that this will change significantly".<sup>v</sup>

I would argue otherwise. These relationships do indeed constitute security architecture in East Asia, albeit an architecture that comes in many overlapping forms, with varying levels of formality and status. At the present time such architecture includes: multilateral fora such as the Six Party Talks, various Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiatives, Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as well as more or less formalised bilateral and trilateral arrangements amongst other things.<sup>vi</sup> Furthermore, not only is there now discussion of a possible North Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NAPSM) as heir to the Six Party talks, East Asian architecture could well come to encompass broader arrangements if more is made of the ASEAN system, or if there are new developments with the US alliances and relationships in the region, or if the much discussed 'Concert of Democracies' is realised. This paper outlines some of the issues surrounding these two main options before quickly sketching a few other possibilities: great power concert; issue-based cooperation; or a greater consolidation of cooperation at the level of Defence Ministers. I close with a quick summation of New Zealand's concerns in all of these matters. In addition to specific concerns to see successful denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, to promote regional confidence building measures and to see bilateral relationships stable, there is a very strong interest in staying engaged with any emergent Asia-Pacific security mechanism and in trying to make the reach of such a mechanism.

Overall in discussing this particular issue I think there are four main issues to be cognisant of in assessing East Asian security architecture and any likely future paths. The first is the question of one architecture or many; the second is who is in and who is out of such structures; the third is what issue comes under the remit of that architecture and the last is at what level of government – heads of state or other?

## Current State of Relations

The first form of security architecture we have within the East Asia region is that constituted by bilateral relationships. Bilateral relations in the region do, on the whole, seem really rather healthy. In looking to the current status of bilateral relations we can see that there is room for optimism – indeed in beginning with relations between the *US and Japan* we can see that this relationship remains strong, and has been further bolstered by recent developments such as Prime Minister Fukuda's ongoing commitment to refueling US vessels, bilateral cooperation on missile defence, and the strengthening of the Trilateral Security Dialogue, amongst other things.

However, perhaps the relationship that most often captures attention both in and of itself and in terms of how it impacts other relationships in the region is that of the current state of *Sino-US Relations*. Here there have been a number of important developments in recent times with the 4<sup>th</sup> U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue being held in Annapolis, a telephone link being installed between the U.S. Department of Defense and China's Ministry of Defense, and talks being launched on nuclear policy and strategy. The U.S. and China also held a round of their bilateral dialogue on human rights after a hiatus of six years and vice-foreign minister-level talks on security issues were held for the first time in four years. Finally two way trade is over \$390billion and foreign direct investment continues to grow strongly.<sup>vii</sup>

In terms of current relations between *South Korea and USA*, in April 2007 the US and Korea reached a free trade agreement that will create a free trade area ranking only behind NAFTA and the EU – with Korea's economy being similar in size of all of ASEAN and estimated as being worth around \$1trillion.<sup>viii</sup> The US has also, despite rumours of a possible shift in policy, maintained a strong military presence in the ROK for a number of reasons.<sup>ix</sup> Indeed in April 2008 Presidents George W. Bush and Lee Myung-bak met for the first time and spent much time discussing the current status of their alliance, agreeing to maintain current U.S. troop levels on the Peninsula, and upgrading the ROK's foreign military sales status. Congressional approval of this request would amount to a substantial upgrading of the alliance relationship. Finally, the two governments inked a memorandum of understanding on security improvements necessary to enable the ROK's entry to the U.S. visa waiver program.

The relationship between *China-Taiwan*, a frequent source of tension in the region, has also eased. Despite concerns that Beijing might not know how to deal with a friendly government in Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou's election in March has since helped bring about a number of positive developments.<sup>x</sup> Formal dialogue between Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) resumed in Beijing in June and reached agreement on weekend charter flights and Chinese tourism.

Back to the Korean peninsula the relations between *North Korea-South Korea* have remained fairly steady despite Lee Myung-bak coming to power in South Korea on the promise of mending fences with the U.S. and taking a more conservative approach towards the north, suggesting that any cooperation would only progress off the back of the North's nuclear disarmament. *South Korea – China* also remains strong, particularly in terms of increasing trade, and commentators have termed the the Sino-ROK relationship as being 'extremely important to Beijing as well as to Seoul' (2003, p49).<sup>xi</sup>

*Japan's* relations with both *North and South Korea* have also improved in recent months with the North's nuclear issue and the abduction issue both being addressed to some extent as well as with a visit by President Lee which renewed talks regarding the possibility of a bilateral FTA amongst other things. And, last, but definitely not least, from an outside perspective *Sino-Japanese* relations seem to have enjoyed significant improvement. Premier Wen Jiaobao visited Japan in April 2007, and was followed by Prime Minister Fukuda visiting Beijing in December 2007, and thence by President Hu Jintao returning the visit in May 2008. This most recent visit to Japan included discussion over issues as contentious as Tibet and the East China Sea dispute. A new concept for dealing with the latter has evolved out of those talks, and Japan's response to the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, an effort which which included contributions of over 1 billion yen, was warmly welcomed.

Yet such relations do not constitute the entirety of the security apparatus in East Asia and indeed this is in part why I would insist that there is a vast *architecture* already in existence. This is in part because such a term suggests overarching structures that span distances, that bear weight and withstand stress but also that not all of that activity is located in one singular location. In addition to bilateral relations, then, we must add additional multilateral relations too, and in particular look to the recent successes of the Six Party Talks.

On October 3, 2007 a Six Party joint statement outlined how North Korea "reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, and know-how" and to make a "complete and correct" declaration of its nuclear programs in return for one million tons of heavy fuel oil or equivalent energy supplies. Such action was to be accompanied by the removal of the DPRK from the U.S. terrorism list and the repeal of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Japan-DPRK relations were to be improved through implementation of the Pyongyang Declaration. From October to July the U.S. and North Korea negotiated bilaterally over how to implement these commitments, and a number of these initiatives began to be realized with the formal submission of North Korea's declaration to the Six-Party Talks on June 26<sup>th</sup>, with President Bush's intent to remove North Korea from the terrorism list and to repeal the Trading With the Enemy Act; and with the disablement of the Yongbyon facilities.<sup>xii</sup> It seemed hopeful, therefore, that 'action for action' was occurring, but some concerns over the process of denuclearization remain.

Some have expressed concern that the June 26 DPRK declaration is not "complete and correct" – that it excludes information relating to non-Yongbyon based facilities in particular and that concrete verification processes should have decided upon prior to the US' agreement to lift certain restrictions and the suggestion by the Chinese Ambassador to the UN that China will propose the lifting of UN sanctions. The emphasis on Yongbyon has also meant that the disablement of that reactor has been interpreted in some quarters as being sufficient reason for the release of the promised energy supplies, the fact that this is contentious combined with a fairly slow move by six-party members towards implementing pledges for energy supplies gives North Korea pretext for balking too. Furthermore, the separation out of the enriched uranium issue from the proliferation issue has also made it difficult to tackle the two together at this stage. And lastly the fact that much of the activity has been predominantly bilateral since October has been interpreted by some as an undermining of the multilateral process at way in the Six Party Talks.<sup>xiii</sup>

In light of these concerns the Six Party Talks reconvened a few weeks ago, at least in part to agree on new verification measures and to try to find a way to ensure progress towards Phase 3 (nuclear dismantlement). Some commentators

have suggested that talk of future promises and developments must not obscure immediate requirements to verify the June 26<sup>th</sup> declaration and to implement nuclear dismantlement and the necessary economic assistance that accompanies this process – that it would be unthinkable, for example, to jump ahead to normalization of US-DPRK relations until all fissile material is removed from the country and the DPRK rejoins the NPT.<sup>xiv</sup>

Whatever their views on how the process has unfolded so far, however, almost all commentators seem to agree that the next phase of denuclearization will be much more fraught than the preceding one of disablement. Given the legacy of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and clear statements from Secretary of State Rice that the actions would be reversed if North Korea's claims could not be verified, it is imperative to keep the diplomatic process on track. Remarks reportedly made by DPRK chief negotiator Kim Gye Gwan that the DPRK is not obliged to accept inspections by the IAEA therefore raise some concerns for the future.<sup>xv</sup> Moreover, George Perkovitch has expressed doubt that the US congress will ultimately deliver "everything we're supposed to deliver. And if you were the North Koreans, you'd have doubts too".<sup>xvi</sup> August 11<sup>th</sup> will therefore be crunch time as the Bush administration will need to be able to convince Congress that enough progress has been made to carry through with removing North Korea from its list of states charged with sponsoring terrorism. Looking beyond this time frame, though, is the question of where to from here to ensure that, if a crisis like that of the DPRK's test in 2006 arises again, institutions are in place to help facilitate crisis management and conflict resolution? China, amongst many other countries, has therefore pushed for a more permanent institutionalization of the Six Party Talks (China Institutes 2002; Van Ness 2005).<sup>xvii</sup>

## Future Options

In 2008 it appears as if Russia will help oversee the development of a new North Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NAPSM) as successor to the Six Party Talks – though the inner workings of this process are not yet known. However public and academic discussions range over a wide range of possibilities, from a narrower NAPSM that focuses on traditional inter-state security concerns such as WMD proliferation in Northeast Asia only, to a broader arrangement that could focus on non-traditional security threats too and that could even potentially be worked in with various economic tracks that would work to provide incentives for improved security conditions.<sup>xviii</sup> Hence retired US Ambassador La Porta has argued that "transcendent Northeast Asia issues, especially energy, finance, trade and transportation, should be locked into a gradualistic consultative framework sooner than later".<sup>xix</sup>

And, indeed, in addition to the question of key foci the question of 'who is in and who is out' also still prevails. In 2007, for example, a bipartisan working group in the US called for a new four-party agreement between the two Koreas, China and the US. Moreover this initial phase was to be followed by the "aggressive exploration" of a "multilateral organization for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia that could grow out of the current six-party arrangement" and that would be modeled on the OSCE.<sup>xx</sup> Similarly Australia's Prime Minister Rudd called for a more inclusive Asia-Pacific community that would bring in the US, India, China and Japan, and in response ASEAN reminded Rudd of the efforts that have preceded this suggestion and has asked for further details to debate the merits of the idea.<sup>xxi</sup> So what are the choices currently on the table for creating a new North Asia (or an even broader) regional security mechanism?

Some have suggested that APEC 'assembles the right heads of state to discuss security' but this is essentially beyond APEC's remit, despite a limited focus on counter-terrorism, pandemics and natural disaster response.<sup>xxii</sup> Instead, then, ASEAN and its offspring are a more likely base from which to construct a more concrete security mechanism. Here some commentators have suggested that "the first East Asia Summit in December 2005 confirmed ASEAN as the driver of the East Asian regional cooperation and integration process".<sup>xxiii</sup> Though this comment may have been directed more at the economic aspects of ASEAN, a number of commentators have called for the ASEAN system to be the basis of any future security community too. Japanese authors such as Kohara Masahiro, for example, have argued that the diversity present in Asia does not necessarily prevent cooperation, and talks of the central importance of the ASEAN+ 3 in the region.<sup>xxiv</sup> Moreover in October 2003 a declaration was signed concerning the establishment of, amongst other things, an ASEAN Security Community.

When assessing the possibilities presented by ASEAN, the reach is most definitely there. Concrete relationships already exist in the form of:

- ASEAN: ten core countries in South East Asia<sup>xxv</sup>
- ASEAN + One: China
- ASEAN + Three: China, South Korea, Japan
- ASEAN + CER: New Zealand and Australia
- East Asia Summit (EAS): ASEAN plus the above and India (16 countries) and Russia observer status
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): the above plus Bangladesh, Canada, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, PNG, Russia, Timor-Leste, US, and Sri Lanka.
- Asia-Europe Meeting or (ASEM): ASEAN+3 & EU
- ASEAN-Russia summit

The key foci of these grouping is often relevant with the latest ARF security dialogue in July 2008 involving 27 countries and focusing on DPRK, Myanmar, food crisis and disaster management.<sup>xxvi</sup> Here ARF's remit is to:

- to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and
- to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region<sup>xxvii</sup>

One American commentator has therefore suggested that first steps in the region might be to create a more specific NAPSM that could then work alongside ARF; that ARF "could transition into a political-security consultative forum in parallel with the Northeast Asia body" where annual plenaries of the new NAPSM would be synchronized with ASEAN Post-Ministerial Consultations.<sup>xxviii</sup> Similarly Chinese academics too have put forward the creation of an East Asian Security Community (EASC) "as a general goal of pursuing common security", focusing on preventing wars, reducing external security threats, avoiding internal conflicts and building sustainable security which would "run parallel with the shaping up of the ASEAN Security Community and the two of them will supplement each other".<sup>xxix</sup> Here it was suggested that ARF could indeed form the basis of such an EASC, that it may follow the institutional form of ARF in terms of a Council, possible Charter and similar style and layout of meetings. And one of the key benefits of the ARF is its inclusivity, a factor that some Chinese scholars claim should be key in the move towards increased institutionalization of security matters.<sup>xxx</sup>

One potential problem with utilizing options from the ASEAN family, however, is that the principles that ASEAN is built on make it useful for those above goals of dialogue, preventive diplomacy and confidence building but it is not necessarily particularly suited to *action*. The key themes of the ASEAN system rest on sovereignty and non-interference, the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective cooperation. Decision making rests on the key principles of compromise, consensus, private talks and unofficial exploratory talks, community spirit, modesty (nobody leads), and search for agreement. The ARF, for example, has therefore often been denigrated as a 'talk shop' that has made fairly minimal contributions to regional security and that cannot be entrusted with solving major security problems.<sup>xxxii</sup>

However, the new 2007 ASEAN Charter which will hopefully be fully adopted by the end of the year aims at being more 'people oriented', strengthening democracy, enhancing good governance and rule of law, and promoting human rights.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Tim Huxley of IISS has therefore pointed out that ASEAN possesses some conflict-resolution capacities in the provision for a High Council and a Troika of the foreign ministers of the groups' past, present and future chairs which have not as of yet been mobilized, and has called for ASEAN to 'grasp the nettle' and to become a much more assertive security actor.<sup>xxxiiii</sup> Chinese scholars too have called for ARF to go beyond a 'Forum' to "discuss not only principles but also concrete matters, enhance in earnest the management of crisis and day-to-day security of the region"; to boost confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) through dialogue and exercises, set up a management regime for unexpected military incidents (pointing to the OSCE's conflict prevention centre); establish a disputes settlement mechanism and so on.<sup>xxxv</sup> Moreover, the ASEAN way is something that fits well with Asian and indeed Pacific cultures, it is perhaps only the Western countries engaged in the region that feel concerned that this 'way' is lacking necessary directness.

Yet it must also be said that the 'ASEAN option', though attractive at first glance, also glosses over the issue of how a strengthened ASEAN framework would work with the existing system of alliances in the region – especially the US San Francisco system. The New Council on East Asian Community (*higashi ajia kyoudoutai hyougika*) therefore seeks to:

- support the ultimate goal of building an East Asian community *as long as the US-Japan alliance is accepted as foundation of Japanese foreign policy*
- democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law and norms, transparency, good governance and other 'universal values' to replace the East Asian Vision Group's catch cry of 'peace, prosperity, progress',<sup>xxxvi</sup>

Indeed it is significant that the US may well seek to take a leading role in shaping the security landscape in the region. Prominent commentator Douglas Paal has therefore argued that:

Whatever its party, the next U.S. administration will find itself facing the challenge of organizing coalitions in Asia that manage both to involve many of the relevant actors and to advance American interests. U.S. leaders have long complained that Asia presents too many international fora doing too little besides talking. The time is ripe for proposing constructive alternatives.

To constructively engage the region by building an effective organization, the U.S. could try to build on one or more of the existing groups, but it

would probably have to press for either additions to, or subtractions from, the membership. Or it could propose something new, which would include the right people to address important issues like humanitarian assistance, pandemics, environmental challenges, finance, trade and eventually security.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

At the recent Shangri-La dialogue Secretary of Defence Robert Gates talked in strong terms about the fact that the US was a 'resident power' in Asia, that the US' alliance systems comprised the backbone of security in the region and that the US stood "for openness, against exclusivity".<sup>xxxvii</sup> The new Administration, whether that be Republican or Democrat, will therefore necessarily be engaged in East Asia – and here one broad factor that may well impact upon the state of East Asian security architecture relates to the issue of the proposed 'concert' or 'league of democracies'.

The notion of a possible 'league of democracies' is an idea fast gaining popularity both with scholars and practitioners in the US.<sup>xxxviii</sup> It is clear that the US still clearly sees this key question of democracy and democracy promotion as a key foreign policy issue. In late 2007 President Bush floated the possibility of a Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership that would "support democratic values, strengthen democratic institutions, and assist those who are working to build and sustain free societies across the Asia Pacific region".<sup>xxxix</sup> More recently Condoleezza Rice wrote an article in the famous journal *Foreign Affairs* separating out states with whom the US dealt with on the grounds of 'interests' versus those with which it shared common 'values', arguing that it was:

the work with our allies, those with whom we share values, that is transforming international politics – for this work presents an opportunity to expand the ranks of well-governed, law-abiding democratic states in out world and to defeat challenges to this vision of international order.<sup>xi</sup>

In building on this long tradition of democracy promotion Senator McCain has called for a 'League of Democracies' with "likeminded nations working together for peace and liberty" that could "act where the UN fails to act", whilst, though initially sceptical, it seems as if Barack Obama may now also endorse the idea.<sup>xii</sup>

This option, of either a broadening and deepening of the US alliance system or a less exclusive club of a 'league of democracies' might well be able to be more decisive in initiating action. Here there has begun a process of deepening relations between the US and its allies, as evidenced by a reinvigoration of relations with Philippines and indeed a cross-working of alliance relations as evidenced by the Trilateral Security Dialogue which commenced in August 2002. In 2005 then Prime Minister Howard referred to it as a way of adding to the alliances of the "three great Pacific democracies" and indeed in that year the dialogue was upgraded from vice-ministerial to foreign ministerial level.<sup>xiii</sup> The biggest role of the TSD is that it keeps all three parties engaged in a high level process, and has concrete manifestations in the form of military exercises.<sup>xiiii</sup> One idea would be to extend this level of interaction slowly from ally to ally to create a new web of stronger security relationships. Moreover, some officials are promoting a Quadrilateral Dialogue with India too, and it is reported that officials from these four states met in 2007 to discuss such an option.<sup>xlv</sup>

However despite potentially having greater 'actorness' in terms of an ability and willingness to tackle difficult security issues, this latter option of basing a new security mechanism around the US' agenda would be fraught with risky political and strategic implications given that it would no doubt be viewed as a policy of containment and exclusion. Even Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines could

also feel left out of this core club.<sup>xlv</sup> More significantly, perhaps, one commentator has already suggested that the TSD is seen a guarantee to ensure that Australia does not get drawn too closely into China's growing sphere of influence.<sup>xlvi</sup> China has therefore issued formal diplomatic protests to Australia, India and Japan over concerns about what is seen as an alliance against China.<sup>xlvii</sup> Indeed the playing out of firstly the SCO's *Exercise Peace Mission 2007* followed by the US-India-Japan-Australia *Exercise Malabar 2007* raises some concerns about the potential rise of two different military blocs in the region.

There are a number of issues to bear in mind with regards to the option of a 'league of democracies' too. For example, although the US does "get along better on average with democracies", Thomas Carothers reminds us that the US still "gets along rather poorly with some democracies" (Argentina given as one example) and indeed "reasonably well and in some cases quite well with autocracies" (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan and so on).<sup>xlviii</sup> Carothers points out that additional reasons for being sceptical about the idea include the strong disagreements that exist between democracies on the issue of international trade, and the fact that it has already been preceded by a very insipid 'Community of Democracies' idea that has not managed to be active on the international scene. Most significant, however, is the danger that this could be seen as a case of an us-versus-them approach when it comes to relations with Russia and China, and that it may well act to undermine the UN whose key strength (and weakness) is its inclusiveness and diversity.

## Conclusions

So, in casting an eye over future possibilities, **one option** here is to first of all create an initial NAPS to deal with more specific issues in Northeast Asia and to look to integrate its security functions closely with the ASEAN system already in existence. A **second option** would be to look to utilise a much broader system based on ASEAN alone with a push to make that system more assertive. A **third option** is to look to a new security entity emerging out of the US alliance system and indeed being based on countries with common democratic values. A **fourth option** not discussed here might be to have the future shape of regional security arrangements decided between the larger powers in the region – the US, China, Japan, Russia and India – though such an option is yet to be put forward seriously and also brings into question the role of Australia and ASEAN countries amongst others. Perhaps instead of beginning with 'who is in and who is out' then, we might also look at what kinds of issues are of contemporary concern. So a **fifth option** for tackling the question of North or East Asia security mechanisms might well be to cast out the question of who is in or out and instead begin with the issues faced. A brief glance at the papers presented in the joint IISS-JIIA hosted 'Asia's Strategic Powers: In Search of a Common Agenda' shows the wide range of security concerns on the table: securing sea lanes of communication, climate change, and nuclear proliferation.<sup>xlix</sup> Instead of working to establish *one* security institution that risks exclusion, then, another option might be to see how to work existing sub-regional institutions together along issue based lines. Inter-regional options include increased interaction between ASEAN and PIF when it comes to non-traditional security threats such as environmental stress (over-fishing, illegal logging and so on), or bringing in the SCO to Six Party Talks when it comes to issues of proliferation or the SCO and ASEAN in dealing with issues of terrorism and extremism.<sup>l</sup> Initiatives taken in non-traditional security spheres such as the Bali Process which deals with human trafficking issues demonstrates how inter-regional issue-based processes can work well.<sup>li</sup> Lastly a **sixth option** might be to begin at a different level of negotiation. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting which is only 2 years old (as opposed to much longer-standing foreign

affairs and trade ministerial connections), may present a fore-runner option to a more comprehensive political option.<sup>lii</sup> The ADMM reports directly to Heads of Government, and last month in June 2008 Australia and New Zealand have expressed interest in joining the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting to create an ADMM Plus system.<sup>liii</sup> Such a system that is run at the Defence Ministerial level might be a testing ground for a broader security system.

Whichever option is pursued the desire to initiate institutions to tackle security issues along more concrete lines even to the extent of creating an organisation like that of NATO is understandable. Yet this is to assume that the option of one concrete all encompassing security architecture is necessarily better, and I am yet to be convinced that this is the way to go. Indeed, there is resistance in the region to necessarily look to such European examples as best practice models – with a concern by some to avoid military blocs that are exclusive in nature that that may presume hypothetical foes.<sup>liv</sup> At the moment all of the options have their detractors, and it should be a long and incremental process – in the vein of ASEAN past – to decide which, if any, kind of option to take. This returns me to my initial assertion. There already IS security architecture in the region. The notion that we must move to change the status quo is not necessarily wrong, but any new move to create major change in the region must take all those with interests at stake along with it or potentially risk much to gain little.

Moreover, whichever option is pursued, from a New Zealand point of view all of these issues related to East Asian security and security architecture affect us to a greater or lesser degree. New Zealand's determination to be involved in the region is underlined by the creation of the Asia Security Fund in 2006 to boost support for regional counter-terrorism capacity, and by the fact the New Zealand hosted the interfaith Asia-Pacific dialogue at Waitangi in May 2007 whilst Prime Minister Clark chaired a symposium on the UN Alliance of Civilisation.<sup>lv</sup> Thus, as the recently released policy paper 'Our Future with Asia' stresses, New Zealand is seeking to integrate itself better into an integrating region, and that the country "faces risks from the development of bilateral and other regional trade agreements in which it is not included".<sup>lvi</sup>

And New Zealand should be concerned about how all of these aspects of East Asian security architecture fare, no matter how far away they might appear. The Six-Party Talks and the events on the Korean peninsula, for example, hold our attention simply through our identity as a population long concerned by non-proliferation and disarmament in general as well as the effects of nuclear technology in all its forms. If denuclearisation of the peninsula cannot be achieved then security in the region diminishes – and could well lead to further proliferation throughout the region.<sup>lvii</sup> It is this concern about proliferation that has, along with other factors such as working with a number of like-minded countries, helped push New Zealand involvement in more controversial initiatives such as the PSI. Debate seems to be ongoing about issues of legality and where the PSI and the ability to interdict vessels fits in terms of UNCLOS and UNSC 1540, but New Zealand is hosting a major PSI exercise in September this year.<sup>lviii</sup> This particular exercise is seen as one way to gain closer ties with countries such as the US, which has to issue special waivers for New Zealand's involvement, and indeed with Japan, who is to be involved to a significant degree in the September exercise. New Zealand's interest in the PSI has to, however, be balanced by an awareness of the fact that others in the region are not so enamoured with the initiative.

This one case underlines how, in essence, New Zealand's approach to East Asian security is a balancing act. There is some concern that involvement in the PSI does not alienate China, and hence the emphasis on the long history of New

Zealand's support for non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives rather than on the PSI being a US-led initiative. Yet we also seek good relations with the US, indeed Condoleezza Rice just (July 26 2008) called New Zealand not only a friend but an 'ally', something that has been made much of in the press. Moreover, in addition to our direct relations with Japan, our close relationship with Australia also reinforces our interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue (though it appears that New Zealand does not currently feel the need to become more closely associated with the Trilateral Security Dialogue, and I think officials probably see it as a very strong relationship between strongly linked allies).

New Zealand is therefore concerned to try to bring all interested parties in the Asia Pacific together rather than see the formation of an exclusionist security mechanism. As a country that has strong relations with a number of significant players in the region and that at times appears to be keen to play an 'honest broker' role, an opportunity to be engaged presents a chance to help smooth over possible divisions between states with divergent interests and values. New Zealand therefore keenly wants to be involved in any new security regime, architecture, system or whatever institution evolves.

## Notes

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<sup>i</sup> A briefer forerunner of this piece is due to appear in the *New Zealand International Review*. The author would also like to thank Asia:NZ, NZIIA and MFAT for including her in a trip to Japan and China to present a summary of this paper at the New Zealand-Japan dialogue on 31 July 2008, as well as to share ideas with academic and official counterparts in Tokyo and Beijing.

<sup>ii</sup> Greg Noble 'Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asia Regionalism', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 8 (2008), pp247-265. points to the work of Fumio (2006), Toshio (2005), Eiichi (2007), Haruki (2003), Makoto (2004), Ito and Tanaka (2005). Most of these, Noble argues, note: the rise of intra-regional trade; growing importance of China; decline of US in region; tension between positive economic relations and caution regarding political or security cooperation.

<sup>iii</sup> Keiichi Tsunekawa 'Why So many Maps There? Japan and Regional Cooperation' *Remapping Asia: The Construction of a Region*, ed., T.J. Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

<sup>iv</sup> One key preoccupation in the regionalism literature is the contrasting of the highly institutionalised regionalism of Europe with the more informal cooperation in Asia. Katzenstein suggests one of the most plausible explanations for the former situation lies in the hegemonic role of the US.

<sup>v</sup> Alan Romberg, 'Future East Asia Security Architecture – Implications for the PLA', *Stimson Centre* as found at <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=444>, accessed 25/7/08.

<sup>vi</sup> For example: the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum; Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue; Western Pacific Naval Symposium as well as CSCAP and other Track II linkages.

<sup>vii</sup> Brad Glosserman and Bonnie Glaser, 'Let Sober Realism Guide US-China Relations in 2008', *PacNet Newsletter #4*, 17 January 2008.

<sup>viii</sup> Troy Stangarone, 'Balancing Interests in the KORUS FTA', *PacNet* 22a April 25 2007.

<sup>ix</sup> According to Alon Levkowitz, 'The seventh withdrawal: has the US forces' journey back home from Korea begun?', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 8 (2008), pp131-148 the reasons for involvement include: deterring the DPRK; demonstrating US commitment to Korea; supporting the Korean economy; maintain balance of power in the region; to prevent the possible initiation of a unilateral military act against the DPRK; underline the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the US. Levkowitz points out that there have been withdrawals in 1947; 1954; 1971; 1978; 1990-92; 2002-2008/

<sup>x</sup> Comment by Ralph Cossa, 'China-Taiwan: Cause for Cautious Optimism', *Pacific Forum CSIS News Release*, PacNote 2-08.

<sup>xi</sup> Relationship only formalised since 1990-1 when China established relations and voted to have it admitted to the UN (DPRK responded by establishing contact with Taiwan).

<sup>xii</sup> As of 1 July eight of eleven agreed disablement actions at the three core facilities at Yongbyon had been completed, and the cooling tower taken down. Sharon Squassoni, Senior Associate Carnegie Nonproliferation Programme 'North Korea: Teleconference with Carnegie Experts', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Thursday 26 June 2008, as found at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/06-26-08-North-Korea-Transcript.pdf>, accessed 28/06/08 discusses how the dismantlement of the reactor was a very symbolic gesture

<sup>xiii</sup> As reported in the *Daily Yomiuri* the Six Party talks have thus far repeated bilateral gains made between the US and DPRK representatives in Beijing on July 8, yielding up agreement on three basic points, with the details as to how to implement the agreement being left up to a working level panel. See: Yoshiharu Asano and Takeo Miyazaki, '6-party talks accord short on details / Pyongyang presses for aid despite vagueness of N-program verification process', *Daily Yomiusi Online*, as found at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20080715TDY03301.htm>, accessed 15/07/2008.

<sup>xiv</sup> James L. Schoff, 'First things first in the Six-Party Talks: verify and implement', *PacNet Newsletter #37*, 10 July 2008.

<sup>xv</sup> Yoshiharu Asano and Takeo Miyazaki, '6-party talks accord short on details / Pyongyang presses for aid despite vagueness of N-program verification process', *Daily Yomiusi Online*, as found at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20080715TDY03301.htm>, accessed 15/07/2008.

<sup>xvi</sup> Comments by George Perkovitch, Director, Carnegie Nonproliferation Programme 'North Korea: Teleconference with Carnegie Experts', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Thursday 26 June 2008, as found <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/06-26-08-North-Korea-Transcript.pdf>, accessed 28/06/08.

<sup>xvii</sup> Peter Van Ness, 'The North Korean nuclear crisis: four-plus-two – an idea whose time has come', *Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific*, (New York: Routledge, 2005).s

<sup>xviii</sup> Liu Jianguo and Yan Xuetong, 'Some Tentative Strategic Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community', Foreign Affairs Paper No.71, *Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs*, 7 December 2005, as found at <http://www.cpiifa.org/en/Html/2005127114622-1.html>, accessed 22/07/2008 mention the importance of fostering broader political, social, cultural and economic cooperation to address all of the different aspects needed to achieve what they call 'sustainable security'. At the present time in August 2008 it appears that the NAPSM may take some time to develop. Different commentators have suggested that the process is being held up by different parties, and one of the key issues is *when* to create such a body. At the moment there appears to be some resistance, for example, to establishing anything concrete until a verification process has confirmed the denuclearisation of the peninsula.

<sup>xix</sup> Ambassador Alphonse F. La Porta, 'Northeast Asia Regionalism and Linkages with Southeast Asia', *PacNet Newsletter #26*, Saturday 10 May 2008.

<sup>xx</sup> Ambassador James Goodby and General Jack Merritt, co-chairs, *Atlantic Council North Korea Working Group Report*, as found at [http://www.acus.org/docs/070413-North\\_Korea\\_Working\\_Group\\_Report.pdf](http://www.acus.org/docs/070413-North_Korea_Working_Group_Report.pdf), accessed 20/07/2008.

<sup>xxi</sup> 'Singapore clarifies stand on Rudd's Asia Pacific idea', *The Strait Times* 16 June 2008 as found at [http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/press\\_room/news\\_archive/singapore\\_clarifies\\_asean\\_stand\\_on\\_rudd\\_s\\_asia\\_pacific\\_idea\\_strait\\_times](http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/press_room/news_archive/singapore_clarifies_asean_stand_on_rudd_s_asia_pacific_idea_strait_times), accessed 25/07/08.

<sup>xxii</sup> Douglas H. Paal, 'Rice's ASEAN Gardening', *Wall Street Journal Asia*, 24 July 2008 as found at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20317&prog=zch>, accessed 25/07/08.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Lai Foon Wong, 'China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1 (2007), p398.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Kohara Masahiro, *East Asian Community: Growing China and Japan's Strategic Choices* (2005) is sympathetic to development issues facing China and talks of the recovery of Chinese power (fukken) rather than its rise.

<sup>xxv</sup> ASEAN: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia

<sup>xxvi</sup> The Associated Press, 'North Korea, Myanmar to dominate Asia's main security dialogue, inflation also on agenda', *International Herald Tribune Online*, as found at

<http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendlyphp?id=1462472> accessed 22/7/08. ASEAN, 'AMM Overview', as found at [http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/about\\_the\\_amm/amm\\_overview](http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/about_the_amm/amm_overview), accessed 25/07/08.

<sup>xxvii</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum, 'About Us', as found at

<http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx>, accessed 28/06/08.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Ambassador Alphonse F. La Porta, 'Northeast Asia Regionalism and Linkages with Southeast Asia', *PacNet Newsletter #26*, Saturday 10 May 2008. Indeed La Porta also suggests revamping APEC to become the counterpart of the EAS.

<sup>xxix</sup> Liu Jiangyong and Yan Xuetong, 'Some Tentative Strategic Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community', Foreign Affairs Paper No.71, *Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs*, 7 December 2005, as found at

<http://www.cpifa.org/en/Html/2005127114622-1.html>, accessed 22/07/2008. These authors also suggest that it may be a better option for India and Pakistan to look to join the SCO, but that the membership of such an EASC should not be exclusive and indeed mentions the possibility of participation by the US.

<sup>xxx</sup> Discussions with scholars from CASS, CIIS, CPIFA in Beijing August 1 2008.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Dr *Yuzawa Takeshi*, Research Fellow, JIIA in a presentation at 'New Zealand-Japan Dialogue' JIIA, Tokyo 30 July 2008 spoke of the fairly minimal contributions made by ARF (confidence building measures are probably the most valuable contributions thus far) but held out some hope for a more assertive organisation, whilst Dr Han Feng, CIIS, talking at an informal dialogue in Beijing August 1 2008 hosted by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs cast doubt on the capacity of the ARF to evolve in this way.

<sup>xxxii</sup> See the ASEAN Charter, as found at <http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>, accessed 29/07/08.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Tim Huxley, 'Grasp Nettle of Security Problems', *IJSS*, 22 July 2008, as found at <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/july-2008/grasp-nettle-of-security-problems>, accessed 27/07/08.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Liu Jiangyong and Yan Xuetong, 'Some Tentative Strategic Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community', Foreign Affairs Paper No.71, *Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs*, 7 December 2005, as found at <http://www.cpifa.org/en/Html/2005127114622-1.html>, accessed 22/07/2008. Additional ideas floated here included: establishing a disarmament and arms control mechanism; a mechanism to combat transnational crime; and a cooperating mechanism for energy security.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Greg Noble, 'Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asia Regionalism', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 8 (2008), pp247-265. The EAVG 'Towards an East Asian Community' recommended that governments make East Asian integration their ultimate objective, and the Sixth ASEAN 10+3 Summit in 2002 had agreed to look at specific ways to create a regional FTA. Emphasis added.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Douglas H. Paal, 'Rice's ASEAN Gardening', *Wall Street Journal Asia*, 24 July 2008 as found at

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20317&prog=zch>, accessed 25/07/08.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> As cited in Ralph Cossa, 'Gates "Reassures" Asia', *PacNet Newsletter #31*, June 4 2008.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Thomas Carothers, 'Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 2008, as found at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20135&prog=zgp&proj=zdr1>, accessed 21/7/08 reviews much of this.

<sup>xxxix</sup> The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "U.S. Commitment to Strengthen Forces of Freedom, Prosperity in Region," September 7, 2007.

<sup>xl</sup> Condoleezza Rice, 'Rethinking the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (4) July/August 2008, p2-26. Rice noted that relations with countries such as China had been on the basis of interests rather than values though, in her words, "they are moving, albeit slowly, to a more cooperative approach on a range of problems". She further states that "democratic state-building is now an urgent component of our national interest".

<sup>xli</sup> Liz Sidoti, 'McCain favours a "League of Democracies"', *Washington Post Online*, 30 April 2007, as found at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/30/AR2007043001402.html> accessed 21/07/08. Daniel Dombey and Edward Luce, 'Obama camp signals robust approach on Iran', *Financial Times Online*, 1 July 2008, as

found at [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/039d5b8a-47b2-11dd-93ca-000077b07658\\_dwp\\_uuid=729ab242-9cb1-11db-8ec6-0000779e2340\\_print=yes.html#](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/039d5b8a-47b2-11dd-93ca-000077b07658_dwp_uuid=729ab242-9cb1-11db-8ec6-0000779e2340_print=yes.html#), accessed 22/07/08.

<sup>xliii</sup> Prime Minister John Howard cited in Graeme Dobell, 'Trilateral Security Dialogue', *ABC News Online*, as found at

<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/notebook/stories/s1375804.htm>, accessed 22/07/08.

<sup>xliiii</sup> Sandy Gordon, *Widening Horizons: Australia's New Relationship with India*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report May 2007 as found at

[http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication\\_details.aspx?ContentID=127&pubtype=5](http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=127&pubtype=5) accessed 4/08/08 points out that in October 2007, for example, navies from the three countries conducted a drill in the Pacific west of Japan's southern Kyushu island that involved two destroyers and two P-3C anti-submarine patrol planes from the Japan MSDF and one P-3C patrol plane each from the U.S. Navy and the Australian air force. A further exercise (*Malabar*) also later involved India.

<sup>xliiv</sup> See: Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, 'Emerging Trends in Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia and India' *CRS Report to Congress*, January 7 2008, for in-depth commentary on this.

<sup>xliiv</sup> Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, 'Emerging Trends in Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia and India' *CRS Report to Congress*, January 7 2008, as found at

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34312.pdf> accessed 24/06/08, p3 Summary.

<sup>xlivi</sup> Professor Hugh White interviewed for Graeme Dobell, 'Australia Seeks to Strengthen Relationship with Regional Neighbours' *ABC News Online*, 2 July 2006, as found at <http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2006/s1676116.htm>, accessed 22/07/08.

<sup>xliivii</sup> Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, 'Emerging Trends in Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia and India' *CRS Report to Congress*, January 7 2008, as found at

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34312.pdf> accessed 24/06/08, cite Brendon Nelson, "China Warns Canberra on Security Pact," *The Age*, June 15, 2007 for this.

<sup>xliiviii</sup> Thomas Carothers, 'Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 2008, as found at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20135&prog=zgp&proj=zdr1>, accessed 21/7/08

<sup>xliivix</sup> Conference Papers, *IISS Website*, as found at <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asia-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers>, accessed 28/07/08.

<sup>i</sup> The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was founded in Shanghai, 15 June 2001 and involves China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its goals: strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy ... making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, to move towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order. Principles include 'Equality, sovereignty, UN, non-use of force'. Security cooperation focuses on the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism (eg when founded members signed the Shanghai Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism & Extremism).

<sup>ii</sup> See: Ralf Emmers, Beth Greener-Barcham and Nicholas Thomas, 'Institutional Arrangements to Counter Human Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific', *Contemporary South East Asia*, 28 (3), pp490-511.

<sup>lii</sup> ADMM is intended to serve the Asian Security Community and the Action Plans of 2004 and 2005.

<sup>liii</sup> Patrick Waters, 'Fitzgibbon Push to join ASEAN Defence Talks', 4 June 2008 from *The Australian* reprinted at IISS, as found at <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/june-2008/fitzgibbon-push-to-join-asean-defence-talks>, accessed 27/07/08.

<sup>liiv</sup> Liu Jiangyong and Yan Xuetong, 'Some Tentative Strategic Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community', Foreign Affairs Paper No.71, *Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs*, 7 December 2005, as found at <http://www.cpifa.org/en/Html/2005127114622-1.html>, accessed 22/07/2008.

<sup>liiv</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Our Future with Asia*, (Wellington: MFAT, 2007), pp24-5.

<sup>livi</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Our Future with Asia*, (Wellington: MFAT, 2007), p6.

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<sup>lvii</sup> Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso tried to initiate a debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Japan after the 2006 test.

<sup>lviii</sup> See: Bethan Greener, 'The Proliferation Security Initiative', *New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies*, November 2007 Vol. 2, pp7-15 for commentary on New Zealand's rationale for involvement in the PSI.

Views expressed in this paper are personal to the author and are not to be taken as representing the full delegation or the Asia New Zealand Foundation